"I've heard people make this claim before but without explaining why. [...] the key risk factors for a dining establishment are indoor vs. outdoor, and crowded vs. spaced. The type of liquor license the place has doesn't matter."
I think you're misunderstanding how the calculator works. All the saved scenarios do is fill in the parameters below. The only substantial difference between "restaurant" and "bar" is that we assume bars are places people speak loudly. That's all. If the bar you have in mind isn't like that, just change the parameters.
It has become really salient to me recently that good practice involves lots of prolific output in low-stakes throwaway contexts. Whereas a core piece of EA and rationalist mindsets is steering towards high-stakes things to work on, and treating your outputs as potentially very impactful and not to be thrown away. In my own mind “practice mindset” and “impact mindset” feel very directly in tension.
I have a feeling that something around this mindset difference is part of why world-saving orientation in a community might be correlated with inadequate opportunities for low-stakes leadership practice.
Here's another further-afield steelman, inspired by blameless postmortem culture.
When debriefing / investigating a bad outcome, it's better for participants to expect not to be labeled as "bad people" (implicitly or explicitly) as a result of coming forward with information about choices they made that contributed to the failure.
More social pressure against admitting publicly that one is contributing poorly contributes to systematic hiding/obfuscation of information about why people are making those choices (e.g. incentives). And we need all that information to be out in the clear (or at least available to investigators who are committed & empowered to solve the systemic issues), if we are going to have any chance of making lasting changes.
In general, I'm curious what Zvi and Ben think about the interaction between "I expect people to yell at me if I say I'm doing this" and promoting/enabling "honest accounting".
Another distinction I think is important, for the specific example of "scientific fraud vs. cow suffering" as a hypothetical:
Science is a terrible career for almost any goal other than actually contributing to the scientific endeavor.
I have a guess that "science, specifically" as a career-with-harmful-impacts in the hypothetical was not specifically important to Ray, but that it was very important to Ben. And that if the example career in Ray's "which harm is highest priority?" thought experiment had been "high-frequency-trading" (or something else that some folks believe has harms when ordinarily practiced, but is lucrative and thus could have benefits worth staying for, and is not specifically a role of stewardship over our communal epistemics) that Ben would have a different response. I'm curious to what extent that's true.
One distinction I see getting elided here:
I think one's limited resources (time, money, etc) are a relevant question in one's behavior, but a "goodness budget" is not relevant at all.
For example: In a world where you could pay $50 to the electric company to convert all your electricity to renewables, or pay $50 more to switch from factory to pasture-raised beef, then if someone asks "hey, your household electrical bill is destroying the environment, why didn't you choose the green option", a relevant reply is "because I already spent my $50 on cow suffering".
However, if both options cost $0, then "but I already switched to pasture-raised beef" is just irrelevant in its entirety.
The recent EA meta fund announcement linked to this post (https://www.centreforeffectivealtruism.org/blog/the-fidelity-model-of-spreading-ideas ) which highlights another parallel approach: in addition to picking idea expressions that fail gracefully, to prefer transmission methods that preserve nuance.
Nah, it's purely a formatting error - the trailing parenthesis was included in the link erroneously. Added whitespace to fix now.
If you have ovaries/uterus, a non-zero interest in having kids with your own gametes, and you're at least 25 or so: Get a fertility consultation.
They do an ultrasound and a blood test to estimate your ovarian reserve. Until you either try to conceive or get other measurements, you don't know if you have normal fertility for your age, or if your fertility is already declining without knowing it.
This is important information to know, in order to make later informed decisions (such as when and whether to freeze your eggs, when to start looking for a child-raising partner, when you need to decide by before it's too late, etc.)
(I wrote more about this here: https://paper.dropbox.com/doc/Egg-freezing-catherios-info-for-friends--AbyB0V0bRUZsCM~QbeEzkNuMAg-tI98uI9kmLOlLRRuO80Zh )
Important updates to your model:
Less important notes: